



PROMOTiON
PROGRESS ON MESHED HVDC
OFFSHORE TRANSMISSION
NETWORKS



Functional Requirements from AC and DC grids to DC grid protection

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
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
- Promotion project
- DC grid protection and WP4 of promotion
- System and Components Constraints
- Expected performance
- First suggestions for functional requirements



Promotion Horizon 2020 project (2016-2019)




Towards an HVDC grids with the most appropriate, cost effective, multi-vendor protection system



DC grids and DC grid protection

- ↗ VSC HVDC is receiving massive attention from industry, especially for offshore connections and interconnectors
- ↗ DC grids are seen as a logical evolution
 - ↗ Offering redundancy
 - ↗ Possible cost savings
- ↗ DC grids require protection
- ↗ Current VSC HVDC protection: at the AC side
 - ↗ → not a good solution for the future pan-European grid



WP4: develop multi-vendor protection systems

- ↗to develop a set of **functional requirements** for various DC grids: from small scale to large overlay grids and for a variety of system configurations and converter topologies
- ↗to analyse a wide range of DC grid protection philosophies on a common set of metrics
- ↗to identify the best performing methods for the systems under study
- ↗to develop detailed protection methodologies for the selected methods
- ↗to develop configurable multi-purpose HVDC protection IEDs to enable testing of the methodologies
- ↗to investigate the key influencing parameters of protection systems on the cost-benefit evaluation



What are our expectations of DC grid protection?

↗ Protection system: What to protect?

- ↗ Humans
- ↗ System
- ↗ Components

↗ For the AC system:

- ↗ After single fault, selective protection system clears fault
- ↗ Backup protection if that fails
- ↗ Protection operates in 60 – 200 ms
- ↗ Operated N-1: no single **credible fault/contingency** causes large sustained outage
 - ↗ Expected behavior at a single line fault
 - ↗ Expected behavior at busbar fault
 - ↗ Expected behavior at fault at lower levels (e.g. distribution)
 - ↗ Fault ride through behavior of wind farm
- ↗ 3 GW / 1.8 GW / ... maximum loss of infeed




What are our expectations of DC grid protection?

- ↗ What about the DC grid?
 - ↗ Same as AC?
 - ↗ Which reliability?
 - ↗ Are the limits (delays, power loss,...) the same?
 - ↗ What are relevant faults at the DC side
 - ↗ Pole to pole?
 - ↗ Pole to ground?
 - ↗ Busbar?
 - ↗ What is the accepted behavior at the DC side
 - ↗ AND the connecting AC systems
 - ↗ Continental Europe, Ireland, offshore wind, offshore load
 - ↗ Do we expect the same for all systems?
 - ↗ Small --> medium --> large



Overview: Fault clearing strategies (zones-impact)

- ↗ Type (a) line protection : impact only on the faulty line
- ↗ Type (b) line+ protection : impact on the faulty line and on the closest MMC converter
- ↗ Type (c) open grid protection : impact of all the breakers at a bus
- ↗ Type (d) grid splitting protection : impact only on the faulty zone
- ↗ Type (e) low-speed HVDC grid protection : impact on the entire grid



Functional requirements?

System and components constraints

Expected performance for DC grids (small, medium and large)


- Various DC faults

Functional requirements for DC grids

- Current technology
- What is the limit now?
- What is the limit in 2050?



Components of DC grid protection: influencing each other



System functional requirements lead to requirements for protection

↗ Selectivity & speed

- ↗ E.g., maximum portion of the grid which can be disconnected
- ↗ Maximum time for which grid can be disconnected

↗ Backup protection

- ↗ Lower probability, but higher impact

↗ Robustness towards system changes

↗ Suitable protection philosophies

- ↗ Selective
- ↗ Partly selective
- ↗ Non-selective

↗ Suitable fault clearing strategies



Protection requirements lead to requirements for protection components

↗ Protection algorithms

- ↗ Speed
- ↗ Selectivity
- ↗ Sensitivity
- ↗ Reliability

↗ Breakers

- ↗ Speed
- ↗ Interruption capability
- ↗ Energy absorption capability

↗ Fault current limiters

- ↗ di/dt ...

↗ Suitable candidates

- ↗ Protection algorithms
 - ↗ Non-unit
 - ↗ Unit/Pilot
- ↗ Breakers: Mechanical, Hybrid
- ↗ Inductors/SFCL/...



Why relevant? Faults occur and they influence the total system


- Potential Faults/events:
 - AC faults (single-phase-to-ground, three-phase-to-ground)
 - Outage of a converter
 - DC line faults (pole-to-ground, pole-to-pole)
 - DC busbar faults
- Potential effects on the AC & DC systems:
 - DC system: overvoltage, under voltage, overcurrent, DC grid instability, DC overload
 - AC system: overvoltage, under voltage, overcurrent, AC grid instability (transient stability, small signal stability, frequency stability), AC overload
 - → what is acceptable?




DC Line (pole-to-ground) fault: example 1

Utilizing fast selective DC protection (fault clearing ~5ms):

- DC system:
 - Possible overload post fault clearing
- AC system:
 - Very short transients



Test system: 3-terminal bipolar with metallic return





DC Power during and after pole-to-ground fault

DC Line (pole-to-ground) fault: example 2

Utilizing AC circuit breaker for fault clearing (fault clearing 2~3 cycles):



- DC system:
 - Outage of the whole DC system
 - Possible large fault currents depending on grounding configuration
- AC system:
 - See multiple short-circuit faults once converters are blocked
 - Possible instability



DC Line (pole-to-ground) fault: example 3

Utilizing converters with fault blocking capability:


- DC system:
 - Outage of the whole DC system
- AC system:
 - Short interruption
 - Possible instability
 - Asynchronous AC systems
 - Synchronous AC systems



HVDC converter outage: influence on ac frequency and generator rotor angles



Simplified representation of ac system:

- Equivalent synchronous generator (SG_{eq}) with inertia constant H
- Droop control action is neglected within the considered time frame (0-0.2s)
- HVDC converter outage = Load step on synchronous generator





$$2 \cdot H \frac{d\omega}{dt} = \Delta P = P_{HVDC}$$
$$\frac{d\delta}{dt} = \omega_{base} \cdot (\omega - 1)$$

For H = 5s




For $\Delta T = 0.1$ s



Constraints from synchronous AC Systems

↗ Maximum loss of power infeed and duration:



Constraints from asynchronous AC Systems

↗ Maximum temporary power loss and duration

↗ at **a node**

↗ to **a synchronous zone**

↗ to **a control area**

↗ Voltage support requirement




Constraints from wind farms

↗ Point-to-point HVDC offshore links

↗ AC fault ride-through: hundreds ms (e.g. 384 ms for 30% $V_{\text{remaining}}$ GB [1])


↗ DC faults are protected using AC circuit breakers: 2~3 cycles



↗ Constraints to DC grids:

↗ Fault interruption: within 2 ~3 cycles

↗ Converter DC LVRT capability?



[1] A. J. Beddard and U. Oj, "Factors Affecting the Reliability of VSC-HVDC for the Connection of Offshore Windfarms," PhD thesis, 2014.

Constraints from DC grid components

↗ Converter (for all types of converters):

↗ U_{dc} at the converter terminal

↗ Normal operation: 90% - 110%

↗ Minimum voltage and duration for a converter has to stay unblocked: 0.8pu hundreds ms?

↗ I_{arm} of the converter


↗ IGBT (maximum instantaneous current limit):

↗ 2 [pu] on maximum dc value allowed by IGBT

↗ Future technology: SiC, GaN?

↗ Diode/thyristors

↗ Surge withstand capability [kA2t]



DC fault ride through capability



When a converter is allowed to be blocked and tripped




Constraints from DC grid components


➔ Currently collecting inputs for different components

↗ DC Circuit Breakers: constraints to relay speed

Parameter	Unit	Typical value	Foreseeable values(2030-2050)
Breaker tripping delay	[ms]	Hybrid: 2-3 ms, Mechanical: 5-10 ms	
Fault current interruption capability	[kA]	Hybrid: 5-10 kA, Mechanical: 10-16 kA	
Energy absorption capability	[MJ]	~ 10 MJ	
Bypass delay	[ms]	?	
Residual current interruption capability	[kA]	0.1 kA	
Maximum current rate of rise	[kA/s]	3-5 kA/s	
Maximum breaker surge arrester voltage	[pu]	1.5	
Rated voltage	[kV]	320	500?



Structure of a DC circuit breaker





Fault interruption process

Constraints from DC grid components

↗Cable constraints [3]:



Parameter	Unit	Typical value	Foreseeable values(2030-2050)	Remarks
Lightning impulse withstand level	[pu]	2,1 (same polarity)		Lightning impulse withstand level
Switching impulse withstand level	[pu]	1,2 (opposite polarity)		Switching impulse withstand level
Maximum continuous dc voltage (applied during type and routine test)	[pu]	1,85		Maximum continuous dc voltage (applied during type and routine test for 15minutes)
Thermal overload limit	[pu]	?		





[3] Cigre WG B1.32 - Recommendations for testing DC extruded cable systems for power transmission at a rated voltage up to 500 kV

Towards Functional Requirements of DC Grids

- Stress on AC and DC system
- AC side system fault ride through capability
- DC side voltage capability
- Chicken and egg problem: DC grid design depends on what we expect from its operations and operational expectations depend on the system in place
- What do we want as behavior? What is acceptable?



Questions?



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APPENDIX

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